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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Medical costs in the United States began rising 
dramatically in the 1960s. The senior citizen sector of the 
population was not exempt from inflating costs. To help 
offset these increases, "in 1971, the Health Facilities 
Planning Act created certificate-of-need controls on hospital 
capital projects and authorized the state of New Jersey to 
set payment rates for Blue Cross and Medicare patients" 
(Goldberg 1984). This act was an initial attempt to curtail 
an increasingly explosive drain on government Medicare 
dollars- The Health Facilities Planning Act also created the 
forerunner of a new method of providing for the costs of 
health care of America's senior citizens. The new method, a 
prospective payment system for facilities and providers of 
health care, would reimburse the provider for a patient based 
upon the individual's primary diagnosis.
This new system placed illness into groups of 
severity based upon diagnosis, the assumption being that 
individuals with similar diagnoses should require similar 
degrees of Medicare services (hospital stays, physician 
visits, diagnostic testing). The system reimburses the
1
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hospital for a patient based upon the diagnostic group into 
which that individual falls. A set fee schedule is allotted 
for each diagnostic group. No additional funds are awarded 
to the hospital for additional treatment rendered for 
increased lengths of stay for the individual. If a patient 
is discharged substantially prior to the allotted length of 
stay suggested by Medicare, the facility may gain financially 
since reimbursement of allotted fees (for the diagnosis) is 
not required by Medicare. It may, therefore, be to the 
economic advantage of a hospital to discharge a patient prior 
to curtailment of the Medicare fee schedule.
This prospective payment system, now to be referred 
to as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), is a rislc-based 
system. The hospital and provider may either make a profit 
or sustain financial loss based upon the amount of services 
rendered an individual and the amount of time it takes to 
provide such services.
The DRG payment system differs substantially from 
prior reimbursement systems under the Medicare program. In 
the past, a facility or provider was reimbursed for any 
services a patient required. There were no fixed guidelines 
for how long an individual could be hospitalized nor a fixed 
dollar amount to cover services rendered. A provider was not 
at financial risk for treating a Medicare or Medicaid 
recipient no matter how acute the patient's condition. The 
greater the amount of services received by a patient, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
greater the dollar amounts Medicare would pay the hospital 
providing the services.
DRGs are the federal g o v e r n m e n t ’s most recent attempt 
to find an alternative to cost-based payment for services in 
a competitive market. The DRG system reimburses a facility a 
fixed rate (based on national average costs) for providing 
inpatient services efficiently and economically. The payment 
will, therefore, reflect an average charge for providing such 
medical care. It will not directly reflect an individual 
institution's cost for rendering each service. It is 
anticipated that by providing a fixed rate of reimbursement, 
hospitals will reduce excessive services. Each facility will 
receive a constant rate of payment which it will have to use 
to meet hospital costs. It is also hoped that by allowing 
all hospitals the same rate of reimbursement for a given DRG, 
facilities will need to compete with each other to meet 
patient demand while maintaining costs at or below DRG rates. 
In this way, DRGs are anticipated to encourage both efficient 
and economic behavior within the health care industry (Rajani 
and Dally 198 3).
This paper will address the following; Medicare 
history; possible impact of the DRG system on accessibility 
to medical services for senior citizens; potential effects on 
medical educaticn in teaching facilities; and possible impact 
on patients requiring long-term care for chronic conditions. 
This paper will present recommendations but not attempt to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
draw formal conclusions concerning the ultimate effects of 
DRGs on quality of care. Medicare's prospective payment 
system is still in its infancy. Therefore, conclusive 
statistics on impacts and projections for the DRG program are 
not yet available. It is for that reason that this paper 
must limit itself to raising issues of concern and reviewing 
the initial evidence regarding the impact of the DRG payment 
system.
History
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, 
medical costs escalated dramatically after 1970. From 1970 
to 1981, federal expenditures for Medicare escalated 
approximately 600 percent, compared with about 500 percent 
for Medicaid and approximately 350 percent for all national 
health costs other than federal spending (Haschke 1983) . The 
dramatic rate of increase in health care costs is illustrated 
by a comparison with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Between 
1970 and 1983, the CPI increased approximately 4.5 percent 
annually, while physicians' fees increased at an average 
annual rate of 11.3 percent and facility charges at a rate of
12.4 percent. In 1982, the rise in health expenditures was
15.4 percent. Currently, health service charges account for 
about 10.5 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
projections anticipate that figure may exceed 12 percent 
prior to the year 2000.
According to Haschke (1983), the dramatic rise in 
health care costs has been influenced, in part, by Medicare's 
retrospective cost-based reimbursement system. This system 
did not offer hospitals much incentive to contain costs. The 
cost-based method of payment actually encouraged hospitals 
and physicians to provide extensive Medicare services. The 
greater the number of services a patient received, the larger 
the payment from Medicare. At the same time that Medicare 
(and third-party insurance companies) were reimbursing 
services based on cost, technology was advancing and making 
available services much more expensive. Expensive 
technology, availability of third-party insurers, and the 
absence of incentive to control costs, resulted in large 
increases in health care costs. It is hoped that prospective 
payment in the form of DRGs will reverse the incentive for 
h ospitals.
The previous paragraphs provide illustrations showing 
rising costs and the beginnings of the DRG system. The 
following paragraphs will take a closer view at the formation 
of the present Medicare system.
Medicare was created by Congress in 1965. Its 
p rpose was to pay hospitals for inpatient services provided 
to Medicare beneficiaries based on reasonable and necessary 
costs. For a hospital to receive reimbursement, the facility
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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submitted annual cost reports which detailed expenses 
incurred by Medicare patients. Expenses or costs allowed 
included operating and capital costs as well as net costs of 
approved educational services. In 1982 members of Congress 
passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
(TEFRA). TEFRA placed a hospital-specific ceiling on the 
amount of inpatient operating costs per patient that would be 
eligible for reimbursement. In 1983 members of Congress 
enacted amendments in Social Security which required that 
Medicare reimbursement for inpatient hospital services be 
based on diagnostic related groups (DRGs). The Medicare DRG 
prospective payment system became effective October 1, 1983,
and was to be phased in over a four-year period. All 
hospitals will be required to conform to DRG guidelines as of 
the start of its next fiscal year after October 1.
Each facility will be phased into the system over the 
span of three years. During the first year, 25 percent of 
Medicare's payment will be based on the prior year's costs 
for each discharge. This cost will be adjusted for inflation 
plus 1 percent to help off-set changes in service intensity. 
During the second year of participation, reimbursement will 
reflect a 50:50 ratio from Medicare; in the final year of 
implementation, 25 percent of reimbursement is to be based on 
cost per discharge and 75 percent will be based on DRG 
standards. After the third full year of participation, 100
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
percent of medical service reimbursement will be by DRG 
(Rajani and Dally 1983).
In an effort to alleviate some of the financial 
burden on hospitals during the phase-in period, reimbursement 
rates will take into account the varying percent mixes of 
national and regional cost averages for each DRG. The 
regions will be determined by which of the current six census 
zones into which it falls. Each zone will reflect local 
hospital wage levels. The wage difference should reveal the 
standard urban/rural scale used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. At the termination of the three year phase-in 
period, there will be one uniform payment for each DRG. The 
rate will be determined by the average cost for that DRG 
nationally (Rajani and Dally 1983).
In summary, the Medicare DRG system was instituted by 
Congress in a cost saving effort. The program is to be 
implemented by all hospitals over a three year period to end 
by 1987. The hope of congressional members is that by 
treating similar groups of illnesses with similar amounts and 
lengths of inpatient medical care with a fixed rate of 
reimbursement, excessive costs may be reduced. In the 
following chapters of this paper, the question of DRG 
effectiveness in relation to the nation's costs for this new 
program will be addressed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON MEDICAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
As of 1987 the DRG system will not take into account 
the different operating costs incurred by various types of 
hospitals. Administrators, however, claim that large 
regional and specialty facilities see more severely ill 
patients with complex illnesses than the small community 
hospitals. Because they see a greater number of complex 
cases, it costs these hospitals more to care for these 
individuals. Costs are accrued not only in diagnostic 
testing but in additional inpatient days required by many of 
the patients. To serve both the function of supplying 
adequate professional care and teaching members of the 
medical profession, most of these large institutions have 
become teaching facilities. In such cases medical interns 
and residents are hired as house staff. While the hospital 
is responsible for offering ongoing instruction to these 
individuals, the hospital must also pay their salaries. 
Congress has not allowed for these additional costs. Rather, 
the congressional committees argue that patients in a 
particular DRG should still cost any facility the same 
approximate amount for providing care.
8
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A Study was conducted in the New York State Office of 
Systems Management to determine differences in costs, 
charges, lengths of stay (LOS), and case mix in thirty-one 
New York State teaching and nonteaching hospitals. The 
purpose of this study was to determine how to apportion total 
inpatient hospital charges for each patient stay in relation 
to amounts of actual services used. When conducting the 
study, any costs incurred from nonrevenue-producing 
(nonmedical) departments were transferred to revenue- 
producing departments, such as radiology, and to clinical 
areas, such as pediatrics. The costs were then applied to 
individual patients. The patient's total indirect medical 
charges were calculated by multiplying each individual's 
costs in each department by the department's costs-to-charges 
ratio obtained from the hospital's Uniform Financial Report. 
Direct medical charges were determined by the days a patient 
spent within a clinical service multiplied by that 
department's usual daily charges.
Both full costs and leveled full costs of charges 
were used in the study. Full costs imply actual inpatient 
charges while leveled full costs are adjusted to consider 
salary and utility cost differences between facilities due to 
geographic location. The study exempted those cases within a 
DRG whose length of stay exceeded the DRG mean by two 
standard deviations or more from comparisons of average costs 
(Frick and Martin 1985).
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All of the hospitals treat large numbers of patients 
with broadly similar diagnoses {See Table 1, Appendix I). 
Table 1 lists the major diagnostic group in which an illness 
or disease is classified. For each group a breakdown of 
total cases is listed for treatment received in teaching 
versus non-teaching facilities. Teaching facilities tend to 
treat more complex diseases. These may include nervous 
system diseases and neoplasms as well as major complications 
from pregnancy and childbirth. Nonteaching hospitals treat 
more cases of illnesses of the digestive and circulatory 
systems. They also frequently see cases of violence, 
poisoning, and accidents (See Table 2, Appendix I) (Frick and 
Martin 1985) . Table 2 shows the thirty highest volume DRGs.
For each category, the percentage of discharges and 
average cost per case are separated for teaching and 
nonteaching hospitals. The teaching facilities average a 
lower percentage of discharges with higher average costs per 
case than the nonteaching facilities. Most surgery performed 
in teaching facilities is considered major surgery (higher 
cost) while nonteaching hospitals more frequently perform 
minor operations such as tonsillectomies or appendectomies.
The New York study found that "the average total cost 
per case of all teaching hospital cases is 63 percent higher 
than the average cost of all nonteaching hospital cases" (See 
Table 3, Appendix I) (Frick and Martin 1985). Table 3 
divides the two types of facilities by number of cases seen.
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their average length of stay, the average cost for the total 
care of each case as well as breaking down total costs into 
average ancillary and routine daily costs per case. The 
teaching hospitals are higher not only in costs but in 
lengths of stay for each patient. The study found that 
routine costs per day were 36 percent higher in teaching 
hospitals ; ancillary costs per case were 66 percent higher; 
and length of stay was 19 percent longer. Of these patients 
with longer lengths of inpatient stay, approximately four 
percent were outliers (over Medicare's guidelines) in 
teaching facilities while only 2,5 percent (approximately) 
were considered outliers in nonteaching facilities. Frick 
and Martin (1985) concluded that "when outliers are excluded, 
average total cost per case in teaching hospitals is 53 
percent higher than in nonteaching hospitals and average LOS 
in teaching hospitals is 15 percent longer" (See Table 4, 
Appendix I). It would appear that the difference in facility 
use is attributable to the difference in costs within a given 
DRG rather than case mix. The study further found that "the 
case-mix differences that exist between teaching and 
nonteaching hospitals explain only one fourth of the higher 
average cost per case of teaching hospitals" (Frick and 
Martin 1985).
Due to the findings, one must question why costs in 
teaching facilities are so much higher than other facilities. 
If the case-mix entering the hospitals and residents salaries
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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are not responsible for the majority of cost-differences, 
what is? Perhaps additional (not necessary) use of hospital 
services such as additional laboratory and radiological 
department resources are used for strictly instructional 
purposes (interns and residents).
A New Jersey study determined that teaching hospitals 
incur higher total costs per patient than nonteaching 
hospitals. One reason for this is the direct cost of paying 
the salaries for the residents and the teaching facility.
Over the past ten years, medical school graduates have 
doubled, resulting in an increased number of residents. 
Teaching hospitals may have increased operating expenses in 
addition to the direct cost of resident's salaries. In New 
Jersey the DRG rates for teaching facilities are consistently 
higher than for nonteaching facilities. In certain DRGs the 
costs for treatment in a teaching facility may be as much as 
25 percent higher than care in a nonteaching institution.
For example, in a comparison of costs, 1984 direct patient 
care costs for a myocardial infarction was $4,153 at a major 
teaching hospital, $3,484 at a minor teaching hospital and 
$3,341 at a nonteaching hospital in New Jersey (Congressional 
Conference Proceedings 1983). Due to the increase of costs 
for care in teaching facilities, one must evaluate whether 
educational costs are an appropriate use of medical services 
and whether government payment systems should be responsible 
for meeting such training expenses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The issue of whether DRGs should take into account 
teaching expenses was addressed in 1983 during a 
congressional proceeding. Members of Congress were concerned 
that teaching hospitals' financial problems are a direct 
result of DRG-based per-case payment. As mentioned 
previously, teaching facilities often treat patients with 
more complex or severe illnesses than nonteaching hospitals. 
One way of providing more efficient and possibly better 
medical care to the seriously ill is through research and the 
development of new technology. Often research involves 
costly trial and error methods. While DRGs are, in theory, 
supposed to take into account severity of patient illness, in 
use they tend to produce uniform groups which underpay for 
seriously ill patients and overpay for those less expensive 
to care for. Under the cost-based system of reimbursement, 
patient care revenues supported research at teaching 
hospitals. By contrast, DRG per-case rates place teaching 
facilities at a fiscal disadvantage (Congressional Conference 
Proceedings 1983).
Medicare has attempted to subsidize teaching 
h o spitals’ additional costs by raising all their per-case 
rates. One difficulty with this procedure is that hospitals 
find themselves in a competitive market for providing medical 
care to those in need. Should patients c’'oose to seek care 
at a less expensive institution, teaching facilities may find 
themselves in a tighter financial position than they are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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currently experiencing. It may not be realistic to expect 
university hospitals to absorb educational costs 
indefinitely. Without another source of funding to support 
teaching costs, university hospitals may be forced to limit 
themselves to providing services which other facilities 
cannot or will not provide. This will not only effect 
immediate patient care, but may also limit the accessibility 
for graduate medical education.
Finally, DRGs have affected teaching facilities 
outside the physical boundaries of those facilities. Many of 
the experimental and new techniques used on patients admitted 
to university hospitals are researched in exterior 
laboratories. The funding for medical research was 
drastically cut at the same time DRGs were implemented, thus 
creating increased financial costs for continuing research. 
Graph 2 (Appendix II) shows research funds beginning in 1970 
at $40 million, peaking at $65 million in 1970 and steadily 
being reduced (except for slight increases 1978-1981) until 
1984 at $10 million. As Friedman (1984) notes, "federal 
funding for health services research is down from its high 
point in the 1970s, Congress has typically viewed health 
services research as an 'easy m a r k ' for budget cuts."
The question of who should pay for research and 
medical education is controversial. What is not in question 
is that all patients deserve equal access to and availability 
of medical services. There are specific groups of patients
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who may be effected more severely by DRGs since they require 
longer-term and/or .more extensive medical care. Due to the 
recent severity of their medical status, these individuals 
are frequently treated in teaching facilities. The next 
chapters will address their situations in greater depth.
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CHAPTER III
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE DRG SYSTEM 
ON ACCESSIBILITY TO MEDICAL SERVICES
Medicare's new prospective payment system may have 
effects on access to medical care for the elderly population. 
The emphasis of the next two chapters will be to take a 
closer look at whether Medicare recipients will find their 
access to care diminished under the DRG system. For the 
purposes of this paper, access may be defined as "those 
dimensions which describe the potential and actual entry of a 
given population group to the health care delivery s ystem” 
(Technology Assessment Board 1985).
There are several ways in which DRGs may affect 
access to inpatient medical care. These include : effects on
the number and distribution of hospital beds, effects on 
admission policies of hospitals, effects on discharge and 
transfer policies of hospitals, effects on treatment received 
after admission to the hospital, and effects on the variety 
(or lack of) of services offered by a hospital. The DRG 
system has a direct effect on these individual segments of 
inpatient care due to the amounts of financial reimbursement
16
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a facility can expect to receive for treating Medicare 
beneficiaries.
Hospitals provide inpatient medical care. Medical
care is, however, a service for which a fee is charged and
reimbursement is expected. The United States economy is
primarily based on making a profit. Hospitals expect to be
profitable sources of business. Merrill (1984) describes the
resulting problem in this way:
The DRG system makes a hospital into a shoe store (or any 
other store selling a product) in the sense that it sells 
a product and gets paid a price for that product. The 
more of that product it sells, the more money it makes. 
Thus, if it increases the number of admissions or shoes 
it makes more money. So, if it has DRGs for which the 
cost of care is less than for another DRG but the price 
is the same, the net return will be greater. Albeit 
oversimplified, there will be some similarity in the 
minds of hospital administrators on how the system will 
work as with that of any entrepreneur selling a product.
Similarly, Lang (1984) describes the problem in this
way ;
The DRG system establishes a set of hospital "product 
lines" for which "retail prices" will be known. The 
hospital must reduce costs to the level of the retail 
price (DRG) or lose money. One way of looking at this 
system is that a patient is now billed as a complete 
finished product (one appendectomy, one mitral valve 
replacement, and the like) rather than being billed for 
the total of goods and services the patient consumed 
while in the hospital. There is a real wish that the 
product will be cheapened to reduce costs, which will 
sacrifice patient care.
(Lang 1984).
There a - e two methods of increasing the amount of 
reimbursement a facility can expect. Increase the overall 
number of admissions, or admit those patients whose illnesses
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fall into more profitable DRGs. Wennberg (1984) argues 
hospitals will reduce lengths of stay in an effort to cut 
per-case costs. However, by discharging patients sooner, 
hospital occupancy rates will fall. One method of 
alleviating low occupancy is to increase admissions. This 
will be of particular interest to physicians who own shares 
in for-profit hospitals especially if the physicians receive 
bonuses based on profit. Hospital administrators may be 
inclined to recruit physicians whose methods of practice 
coincide with the most profitable mix of medical services. 
With an increasing supply of medical school graduates, it 
will be to every physician’s incentive to make sure their 
facility is profitable (Wennberg 1984).
While hospitals will strive to increase admissions, 
they will also become selective regarding which patients for 
whom they prefer to provide services. Medicare's DRGs limit 
the dollar amount of reimbursement that can be expected. 
Because of this, facilities have an incentive to admit those 
who have the financial means to pay for care. There is also 
the disincentive to provide charity care. While presently 
hospitals limit the number of gratis admissions, in the 
future charity cases may find medical care increasingly hard 
to obtain (Technology Assessment Board 1985).
As mentioned previously, in addition to increasing 
the number of admissions, selectivity of profitable patients 
can raise hospital reimbursement. DRGs may encourage both
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the selection of patients by DRG to be admitted as well as
the types of DRGs for which a hospital will choose to offer
treatment. As Merrill (1984) notes.
Hospitals might be a little more selective as to which 
admissions they want. They no longer want high cost 
admissions with low DRG payments. They now want low cost 
admissions with high DRG prices. This may, perish the 
thought, cause a little unconscious selectivity on the 
part of the hospital.
Certain DRGs are usually more profitable than others. 
At the present time, DRG reimbursement rates probably exceed 
the marginal care costs for all DRGs. In the future, 
hospitals may find it to their advantage to specialize in 
admitting and treating those patients who fall in the more 
profitable categories of DRGs. In extreme cases, hospitals 
may find themselves inclined to curtail treatment of certain 
DRGs or certain patients within a specific DRG.
While hospitals may either choose or be forced into
specializing the type of medical services they will provide,
some facilities are finding avenues around or loopholes in
the DRG reimbursement system. By upgrading the DRG for which
an individual is admitted to the hospital, or discharging and
rapidly readmitting the same patient under a different (often
more profitable) DRG, a facility can increase its amount of
reimbursement. This phenomenon is known as "creep." A
physician states:
The literature has emphasized the possibility of 'gaming' 
DRGs through the careful choice of principal diagnosis.
In its most flagrant form, so-called DRG creep could 
involve direct fraud, but we believe that illegal 
behavior would not be necessary. Leading physicians have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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joined administrators in emphasizing to other doctors 
that their institution's welfare requires that they 
document all diagnoses and procedures in order to 
maximize reimbursement for each patient. Administrative 
pressures and interest in the hospital's solvency will 
encourage doctors to become very knowledgeable in 
choosing and ordering diagnoses to maximize hospital 
i n c o m e .
(Stern 1985). While illegal actions may not be necessary in
an effort to maximize patient reimbursement, physicians may
document excessively severe diagnoses. The greater the
severity of a diagnosis, the longer the length of stay and
reimbursement allowed by Medicare.
If current proposals to link physician payment, as well 
as hospital payment, to DRGs are adopted, physicians may 
also have a direct financial incentive to choose the 
diagnoses that maximize payment. Even if these proposals 
are not adopted, institutions can use computer software 
packages and manual chart review to identify combinations 
of diagnoses or procedures that maximize reimbursement.
(Stern 1985).
Whether or not creep is being applied to the extent 
of achieving fraud, the question of why the government is not 
curtailing this practice may reflect the difficulties of 
documenting reimbursement claims. For the government to 
detect creep, sampling of Medicare reimbursement claims would 
be required. The greater the size of the sample used, the 
greater the size of the detection system required to monitor 
the sample. Should fraud be detected, future sample sizes 
would need to be increased and again the system would be 
required to expand. Inevitably, the detection system would 
need to become so large and elaborate as to be economically 
unfeasible (Bukantz 1985).
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Administrative costs for a creep detection system 
would escalate dramatically since the incidence of creep, is 
rising at an alarming rate. Originally, the Health Care 
Financing Administration estimated a 3.4 percent increase in 
the case m i x - i n d e x . The index is a measure of illness 
severity for hospital inpatients. One year later, the agency 
increased its original estimate by over 70 percent, to a 5.9 
percent rise in case-mix (Stern 1985). The incident of usage 
of creep continues to increase. Should the government choose 
to attempt to adequately monitor c l a i m s , administrative costs 
might exceed any savings DRGs have provided the Health Care 
Financing Administration.
To this point of the chapter, cost incentives to 
hospitals for limiting types of services, types of patients 
admitted and number of admissions have been addressed. A 
varying number of unprofitable admissions are made to 
hospitals. As has been discussed, it is to the facility's 
economic advantage to discharge these patients as rapidly as 
possible. The next portion of this chapter will address how 
these patients may be treated while hospitalized and what may 
happen to these individuals when they remain inpatients past 
the D R G 's criteria for recommended length of stay.
Two consequences may result in the stay of a 
nonprofitable Medicare patient. The first is that 
preventative or defensive medical services (testing, therapy) 
may not be performed. Hunt (1983) suggests that in an effort
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to keep their facilities more profitable and their own 
medical practices from being questioned, doctors may feel 
pressured to curtail some services. Medical services which 
do not directly effect patient outcome but are presently done 
for the purposes of completeness of defensive medicine may be 
limited in the future. Physicians who do not limit such 
services and continue to increase costs for their hospital 
may be requested to modify their methods of practice. In 
some extreme cases, physicians may lose hospital privileges.
The second possible result for a nonprofitable 
Medicare patient is impersonal treatment. In recent years a 
major criticism aimed at physicians has been that doctors 
have become more insensitive and impersonal. Doctors may 
refer to patients by whatever disease for which they were 
admitted. For example, the "acute cholecystitis in room 406" 
or "the appendectomy in the O.R." Some of this 
depersonalization may be enhanced by the DRG system by 
categorizing individuals into impersonal diagnostic groups 
{Howard 1984).
Should the hospital find extending a patient's length
of stay too costly for the facility, the patient may either
find himself being transferred or discharged. The problem of
dumping has been described as follows:
Transfers, or the change of hospitals after a patient has 
already been admitted, may present a special access 
problem, sometimes known as "dumping." Dumping refers to 
the practice of getting rid of unprofitable patients for 
economic reasons. Once a patient is identified as 
unprofitable, there is a financial incentive to transfer
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the patient to another hospital, since the initial 
hospital receives a per diem payment for the time it has 
the patient and avoids further losses (the receiving 
hospital gets the DRG payment for the whole s t a y ) . If 
the receiving hospital is actually a more appropriate 
source of care for the patient and if the transfer 
process itself has no adverse consequences, access and 
quality of care for that patient could be improved. But 
the hospital has a financial incentive to "dump" patients 
even when it is not in their best interest.
(Technology Assessment Board 1985).
Not all patients are transferred to other hospitals 
or discharged to their own homes. Many patients are 
transferred to nursing homes. As previously discussed, DRGs 
provide hospitals with financial incentive to discharge 
patients as early as possible. Should a hospital, attending 
physician, or peer review board decide that a patient is no 
longer sufficiently ill to require acute care, an effort may 
be made to discharge the patient. Because patients are 
discharged earlier than they might have been before DRGs, 
many of these people may still require some degree of skilled 
nursing care which may not be available to them in their 
homes. If the hospitals cannot afford to maintain inpatient 
treatment for these patients and the individuals will not 
receive adequate nursing care at home, the demand for skilled 
nursing home beds will increase. Unfortunately, Medicare's 
benefits for skilled nursing facilities is sufficiently 
limited as to cause financial problems for patients 
discharged early (Technology Assessment Board 1985).
If a hospital wishes to transfer a patient to a 
nursing facility, one must be found that is willing to accept
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a Medicare patient. Very few patients in nursing homes are 
Medicare recipients. Approximately five percent of the 
skilled nursing home industry revenues are from Medicare.
The reason for the limited Medicare population in such 
facilities is that Medicare's coverage for care in a skilled 
nursing facility is even more limited than hospital coverage. 
What care will be covered is also uncertain, which puts 
nursing homes that accept Medicare patients at financial 
risk. In addition to limited coverage, patients admitted 
directly from a hospital may require additional nursing or 
medical care which increases costs to the facility. For 
these reasons many skilled care facilities are hesitant to 
admit short-stay Medicare patients (Technology Assessment 
Board 1985).
Due to the difficulty in finding sufficient numbers
of Medicare receptive nursing home b e d s , some hospitals are
building their own nursing home facilities. As Merrill
(1984) presents the problem.
If there is no access to nursing home beds, hospitals may 
try to create their own access. I know of one hospital 
in Washington, D.C. that is currently negotiating with a 
large chain of nursing homes to have a certain number of 
beds reserved for their patients. In addition, hospitals 
may seek to develop their own nursing home or home health 
agencies to ensure access.
Regardless of whether patients are transferred to hospital
affiliated nursing homes or private facilities, ill patients
are still being discharged from hospitals in a cost saving
effort.
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One question not yet answered in this chapter is why 
physicians may be permitting their patients to be discharged 
prematurely. The incentive to maintain hospital 
profitability has been addressed, but there is a further 
reason "dumping" may be occurring. If a physician is 
affiliated with a hospital that wishes to keep costs down, 
and the physician does not accommodate the wishes of the 
facility, the doctor may lose privileges and/or employment.
A hospital administrator addressing physicians states; "Your 
hospital may be reluctantly faced with the need to consider 
your financial performance as part of the reappointment 
process" {Goldberg 1984).
This chapter has addressed the effects the DRG 
reimbursement system may have on access to medical services 
for the majority of Medicare recipients. In the following 
chapter this paper will look at a specialized group of 
Medicare beneficiaries, the chronically ill, individuals who 
tend to have more complex illnesses and those requiring 
continuous long-term care for medical problems.
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CHAPTER IV
EFFECTS OF DRGS ON LONG-TERM CARE SPECIALTIES
The Frail Elderly
It is possible that certain classifications of 
individuals are more likely to require extensive medical 
service. These patients will be inclined to be ill more 
frequently (on the ave r a g e ) , have more severe illnesses when 
they are sick, and require longer lengths of hospital stays. 
One such group may be the frail elderly. These people have 
been defined as having "multiple medical problems, or medical 
problems associated with significant psychological or social 
problems" (Berenson and Pawl son 1984). These individuals are 
usually over seventy years of age and are most often treated 
by geriatricians (physicians specializing in the care of the 
aged population) .
Hospitals may be put in a high risk position 
financially when admitting such patients. "The DRG system 
may systematically u n d e r compensate hospitals for treating the 
frail elderly and, therefore, result in attempts by some 
hospitals to reduce or avoid altogether programs in geriatric 
medicine and admissions of frail elderly persons" (Berenson 
and Pawl son 1984) . When the DRG system was established, age
26
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was one consideration in determining classification. The 
problem is that the age break is at exactly seventy years of 
age. No additional payments are offered at age 75, 80 or
above. This is unfortunate because data from the Commission 
of Professional and Hospital Activities show that the average 
length of stay, and probably the cost, increases as a 
function of age for patients over 7 0 ” (Berenson and Pawlson 
1984). The DRG system only allows for one (usually the most 
complex) diagnosis to be listed by the hospital when the 
facility is requesting reimbursement. Since the frail 
elderly often have several clinical problems at any given 
time, the DRG system short changes the hospital on costs 
necessary to provide adequate and complete services,
A further factor to consider is the high incidence of 
outliers among the elderly. One reason may be focused on 
discharge planning. If a younger individual undergoes 
surgery, after a brief hospital stay, the patient may be able 
to complete his recovery at home. In the case of an elderly 
individual (especially one living alone) this may not be 
practical. The decision must then be made on whether to keep 
the patient in the hospital (at a loss of funds for the 
facility) or transfer the patient to a nursing care facility. 
While early discharges may be advantageous for some persons, 
"early discharges may also increase the severity of illness 
at discharge and thus intensify care needed by patients
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placed iiï nursing homes and home care settings" (Berenson and 
Pawl son 198 5) .
Unfortunately for the frail patient, DRGs are
providing financial incentives not only for early discharge
but for admissions (as stated above) to nursing facilities.
So that a hospital can receive as great a reimbursement from
the government as possible, the facilities are branching into
long term care :
Along with new discharge policies and the incentive to 
shorten ALOS comes an incentive under EPS for hospitals 
to benefit from extending their services to other 
set t i n g s . The evidence suggests that hospitals are doing 
this. The number of hospitals offering post hospital 
services (home health care, skilled nursing care, or 
other long-term care) increased between 1982 and 1983 and 
has increased even more since; 17 percent more hospitals 
were offering home health care services in 1984 than in
1983. The number of Medicare-certified hospital-based 
home health agencies increased by more than 50 percent 
during 1984.
(See Table 8, Appendix I) (Technology Assessment Board, 
Congressional Board of the 99th Congress, 1985).
For the above reasons, the frail elderly have become 
undesirable patients in many facilities. The availability 
and location of medical services may be reduced for them due 
to D R G s .
Psychiatry
Another area of medical specialty which may be dealt 
with inadequately by the prospective payment system is 
psychiatry. Mental illness is based largely on personal
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characteristics. Congress has said that "DRGs for mental 
health are based strictly on diagnostic categories.
Treatment and other important patient characteristics are not 
used in the delineation of the DHHS DRGs for mental disorder" 
(Taube and Lee 1984). At the present time psychiatric 
facilities are exempt from DRG regulation. General hospitals 
housing psychiatric wards may request exemption while 
strictly psychiatric hospitals are automatically exempt.
This policy is being evaluated and exemptions may be 
terminated in the near future.
The characteristics of psychiatric patients and the
illnesses that brought them into a hospital setting can vary
dramatically. Because of these variables, lengths of stay 
may be difficult to predetermine. As one author states; 
"Factors such as dangerousness, suicidal gestures, and 
substance abuse may overshadow the diagnostic label proper in 
influencing the decision to discharge. Level of social 
impairment may predict hospital length of stay far more 
accurately than disease characteristics" (Davis and Breslau 
1984) . Beyond the level of social impairment a patient may
experience, is the level of social impact the individual may
have on society as an outpatient. "Hospital stay for 
psychiatric disorders is often influenced by the 
interrelationships of patient and societal characteristics. 
Bizarre behavior may be tolerated in one social setting but 
not in another" (Davis and Breslau 1984).
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Some mental disorders have been found to have longer 
lengths of stay. These include ECT and psychosurgery as well 
as group therapy. Length of stay by given diagnosis appears 
in Table 5 (Appendix I ) .
Within DRG categories there is also a great variance 
in length of stay (See Table 6, Appendix I ) . Such categories 
as DRG 431 (childhood disorders) show the greatest variation 
with DRGs 429 (organic disturbance), DRG 436 (alcohol 
dependence) and DRG 430 (psychosis) are next in variance.
DRG 436 (alcohol dependence) is a primary example in 
the area of psychiatry where patients may receive less access 
to hospital care since DRGs have been implemented. One 
reason for this is that alcoholism increases the probability 
of incurring other illnesses such as cirrhosis of the liver. 
Alcoholism may also increase the severity of other medical 
difficulties a patient may be experiencing such as cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, and complications from accidental 
injuries. As high as 50 percent of inpatient admissions may 
be for alcoholic patients, though most patients are admitted 
for complaints other than alcoholism. Individuals who are 
alcoholics but are not admitted in DRGs directly connected 
with alcoholism or related conditions are often likely to be 
unprofitable patients for hospitals. The lack of 
profitability of these pat:'ents results for a variety of 
reasons. Alcoholics may have physiological difficulties; 
these can include malnutrition, a slower healing rate for
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infections as well as an increased rate of complications.
They may also require additional care since alcoholics may 
request medical care later in their illness than other
patients. This can result in their diseases being in an
advanced state. Since some of these patients can be less 
than willing to comply with advised care when at home, and 
often lack a stable home environment, it may be necessary to 
extend the length of an alcoholic's inpatient stay.
Alcoholics frequently have several medical problems at the 
same time and may require care for more than one illness.
The DRG system makes additional care during any one admission 
unprofitable. Since these patients may not comply with
medical advice, it may not be possible to schedule future
hospitalizations (Technology Assessment Board 1985).
At the present time, DRGs relate directly to Medicare 
patients. Table 7 (Appendix I) shows the length of stay 
distribution for Medicare recipients by DRG. According to 
Taube and Lee (1984), those factors which may "account for 
the within DRG variation in LOS include treatment type, age 
(younger than 20 years of age and the oldest age groups 
generally have longer stays), and legal status of patients."
If Congress should decide to regulate mental disorder 
reimbursement by DRG, it may be appropriate to further 
subclas sify each rel ted DRG category for past average length 
of stay. If this is not incorporated into the payment 
system, psychiatric patients like the frail elderly may
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become threats to the finances of many hospitals. As one 
author states: "Alcoholic and mentally ill patients in
medical or surgical DRGs are particularly vulnerable to 
'dumping.' Moreover, if a particular hospital is known in 
the community to be insensitive to the needs of alcoholic and 
mentally ill patients, then such patients may be less likely 
to select that hospital" (Technology Assessment Board 1985).
Until this point, this paper has provided an overview 
of DRGs. The next chapter will offer recommendations for 
easing the financial impact of this reimbursement system on 
hospitals. Also addressed will be alternative forms of 
funding educational costs in teaching facilities.
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SUMMARY
The preceding chapters have provided an overview of 
M e d i c a r e ’s present prospective payment system. Reasons for 
Congress approving the DRG program, along with a history of 
relevant legislation, were addressed. Chapter two looked at 
how DRGs affect teaching institutions economically, while 
chapters three and four addressed the effects DRGs may have 
on accessibility to medical services for Medicare recipients.
This final chapter will consider recommendations and 
suggestions for easing some of the financial pressures placed 
on hospitals and physicians by DRGs as well as ethical issues 
generated by the phenomenon of creep. Also offered will be 
alternatives for funding medical education costs. Finally, 
two options for changing Medicare's reimbursement system will 
be presented.
The present DRG system has a variety of weaknesses. 
The first section of this chapter will address some of the 
individual weaknesses of the program, after which 
recommendations will be offered which may alleviate some of 
the economic effects of DRGs. DRGs were designed to group 
patients according to similar illnesses and resource
33
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consumption. In grouping patients into inflexible categories 
with a fixed schedule of reimbursement for e a c h , financial 
weaknesses occur. When the Yale research team designed the 
DRG system, they used hospital charges as an approximation 
for actual costs. The costs reflected charges and the state 
of medical practice at the time of DRG development. Future 
costs for technological advances were not reflected in the 
groupings. As technology advances and new, more expensive 
(and effective) treatments are developed, facilities may not 
be in a financial position to provide treatments, since their 
DRG reimbursement would only reflect the amount established 
at the time of DRG development. If DRGs are to be used as an 
accurate indication of patient care costs, current financial 
information should be incorporated into the data base. The 
original data base used to define DRGs consisted of discharge 
abstracts. A recent study conducted by the National Academy 
of Medicine indicates that there may be up to 35 percent 
error rate made in diagnosis and procedure coding (Lang 
1984). As discussed in chapter three, a portion of the 
coding "errors'* are not errors but reflect a common procedure 
of upgrading diagnoses (creep) in an effort to increase 
r eimbursement.
A further weakness of the DRG system is that it does 
not take into consideration patient differences in levels of 
intensity or severity of the same disease or disorder. At 
the time of a patient's admission, variables such as a g e ,
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diagnoses, or socioeconomic status are not evaluated by the 
system even though such factors may influence resource 
consumption (Lang 1984).
Other weaknesses of the DRG system affect
reimbursement and may result in poorer access to medical
services. Another limitation, which relates to standby
requirements for patients, is explained by Lang (1984):
DRGs are based on discharge data and consider what 
happened to the patient. Potential medical complications 
that could have materialized for a patient were not 
considered. For example, if a high risk pregnancy 
results in normal delivery, the DRG system would classify 
the patient as a normal delivery; thus, the 
classification of that patient gives no recognition to 
the special services and equipment needed in the event 
that the risk materialized. Therefore, while the patient 
is classified in the correct DRG (considering the length 
of s t a y ) , the DRG classification does not accurately 
reflect the resource requirement necessary to provide 
care and treatment for that patient.
Not all aspects of how profitable a hospital may be 
are outside the facility's control. The remainder of this 
chapter will be devoted to looking at recommendations which 
may permit facilities and physicians to increase their 
reimbursement. In addition, suggestions for changing the 
present system will be offered.
There are three ways for facilities to attempt to 
increase profits: reduce the cost of each admission,
increase the number of admissions (particularly profitable 
o n e s ) , and develop new sources of profit. Profitability may 
be achieved by offering services not subject to DRG payment
In chapter three these incentives were
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discussed in relation to accessibility to medical services. 
The following strategies from an administrative directive can 
help to reduce costs while hopefully not affecting patient 
care. Recommendations for reducing per-case cost may 
include: "reducing rates of use of ancillary services,
reducing rates of increase in employee wages and fringe 
benefits, purchasing hospital supplies more prudently, 
providing services formerly provided during the stay before 
and after the hospital stay, and adapting general management 
efficiencies" (Technology Assessment Board 1985).
A second recommendation is to increase total number
of admissions. Strategies to selectively increase admissions
would include attempts by hospitals to do the following:
treat patients as inpatients who might otherwise be 
treated on an ambulatory basis, break hospital stays up 
into multiple admissions, identify and attract relatively 
healthy patients within any given DRG by encouraging 
services associated with those patients, expand medical 
staffs in certain specialties and reduce them in others, 
adopt marketing practices aimed at relatively healthy 
patients, and encourage hospitals to expand services to 
areas that are less financially constrained or more 
prof i t a b l e .
(Technology Assessment Board 1985) .
A third recommendation which focuses on developing 
new sources of profits includes growth areas such as nursing 
home beds (discussed in chapter three) and expansion into DRG 
approved outpatient services. One area where hospitals may 
choose to expand as a result of DRGs is in hospital-based 
outpatient surgery. Medicare still reimburses hospitals for 
outpatient surgery on a per-cost basis. If inpatient surgery
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proves to be unprofitable for a patient, facility 
administrators may try to encourage physicians to provide 
necessary care on an outpatient basis. By doing so, overhead 
expenses could be further distributed within the institution 
(Technology Assessment Board 1985).
The preceding recommendations may ease some of the 
financial impact from DRGs on hospitals. The recommendations 
(reducing costs per admission case, increasing admissions, 
and increasing outpatient services) m a y , however, reduce the 
accessibility of medical services. To inhibit this from 
occurring, a further suggestion of increasing peer review 
committees for physicians is recommended. Members of the 
federal government were sufficiently concerned about 
accessibility and quality of medical care to require peer 
review. Every hospital had to contract with a peer review 
organization by October 1, 1984 in order to qualify for
Medicare reimbursement. Three types of review are mandated; 
appropriateness of admission (this is to be based on 
s ampling), review of all outlier cases, and a random sampling 
of discharges to be conducted on a quarterly basis. Outlier 
cases are to be reviewed as either day or cost outliers. Day 
outliers are to be screened and approved for admission, the 
number of outlier days and whether procedural and diagnostic 
coding were valid. Cost outliers are to be evaluated to 
determine if the admission was medically necessary, whether 
services billed for were actually received, ordered by a
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physician, and not duplicately billed. Finally, cost 
outliers are to be reviewed for correct coding (Lang 1984).
Chapter two focused on costs for teaching hospitals. 
Addressed were the increased costs for medical services in 
these facilities. The increase in costs for care were often 
attributed to relying on the patient to support medical 
education expenses. Two possible alternatives for accruing 
funds to pay for educational costs thereby reducing facility 
financial burdens have been suggested. The first suggestion 
is to include a payment source other than patient-care 
revenue. This could be achieved by spreading medical 
education costs across all hospital fees. It is possible 
that these additional fees may be viewed by the public as an 
unwelcomed tax and therefore be impractical. A second 
suggestion could be the addition of a uniform surcharge to be 
pooled so everyone would share in the responsibility of 
medical education (Congressional Conference Proceedings 
1983).
Conclusion
This paper has provided an overview of the DRG 
system. At the present time all Medicare beneficiaries 
requiring inpatient medical services are subject to the 
regulations of the system. Recommendations for assisting the 
present system have been offered. There remains the question
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of whether DRGs are a practical answer to all areas of health
care. A mental health professional offers the following
suggestions for alternatives to DRGs,
Instead of searching for other variables with which to 
define a better "DRG" classification, perhaps we should 
be searching for an alternate basis for a prospective 
reimbursement system- One such possibility is a mixed 
system with a DRG-type reimbursement for acute care and a 
per diem system for long-term care. Another possibility 
is to establish a prospective payment system based on the 
per diem concept instead of the DRG concept. Various 
possibilities should be considered, ranging from one in 
which the reimbursement rate is based on each hospital's 
own historical experience, to one in which rates are 
established for classes of hospitals, or classes of 
patients, or both.
(Taube 1984).
The Medicare prospective payment system is still in 
its infancy. This paper has addressed some of the potential 
effects this type of reimbursement system may be having on 
medical services for Medicare recipients. Whether or not 
DRGs ultimately achieve economic savings should not be the 
deciding factor in whether to keep the system. R a t h e r , the 
more important issue is the final impact on Medicare 
beneficiaries who require medical services. In order to be 
judged effective, DRGs must be both efficient economically 
and effective medically.
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TABLE 1
Percentage Distribution of Cases 
by Major Diagnostic Group
40
Major Diagnostic Group
% %
Teaching Nonteaching
%
Total
I. Infectious diseases 1.6 2.9 2.0
II. Neoplasms 10.9 7.4 9.7
III. Endocrine, nutritional, & other 
metabolic diseases 2.1 1.8 2.0
IV. Diseases of blood & blood-forming 
organs 0.9 0.6 0.8
V. Mental disorders 4.2 3.1 3.8
VI. Diseases of the nervous system 
and sense organs 5.2 3.2 4.5
VII. Diseases of the circulatory system 11.8 13.9 12.5
VIII. Diseases of the respiratory system 5.3 9.0 6.6
IX. Diseases of the digestive system 8.6 11.5 9.6
X. Diseases of the genitourinary system 9.2 9.2 9.3
XI. Complications of pregnancy, 
childbirth, & the puerperium 12.5 9.8 11.5
XII. Diseases of the skin & 
subcutaneous tissue 1.4 1.2 1.4
XIII. Diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system & connective tissue 3.3 3.9 3.5
XIV. Congenital anomalies 1.7 0.5 1.3
XV. Certain causes of perinatal 
morbidity & mortality 1.0 0.4 0-8
XVI. Symptoms & ill-defined conditions 4.2 3.5 4.0
XVII. Accidents, poisonings, and violence 6.8 9.9 7.9
(A) Special conditions &
examinations without sickness 1.7 1.2 1.5
(B) Classification of liveborn
infants according to type of 
birth 7.6 7.0 7.3
SOURCE: Frick and Martin, 1985.
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TABLE 2
Percentage Discharges and Average Cost of DRGs 
Common to Each Hospital Group's Set of 
30 Highest Volume DRGs
— Teaching Hospital- — Nonteaching
Hospital-
%
DRG Discharges
Average 
Cost {$)
%
Discharges
Average 
Cost (S)
318 Normal newborn 7.6 384 7.0 372
278 Delivery— no surgery 4.0 928 4.3 792
281 Delivery with complications 2.7 1,025 1.6 839
271 Abortion— no SD 2.3 458 1.2 496
282 Delivery with caesarean 
section 1.6 1,766 1.2 1,563
266 Disease of female repro­
ductive systems— surgery 1.5 1,913 1.2 1,518
110 Disease of eye— surgery 1.2 1,299 1.0 1,037
121 Acute myocardial infarction 1.2 4,180 1.6 3,040
265 Disease of female repro­
ductive system— surgery, 
SD 1.2 665 1.0 628
145 Circulatory dysfunction in 
brain— surgery 0.9 4,798 1.0 2,929
264 Disease of female repro­
ductive system— surgery, 
no SD 0.9 640 1.1 545
89 Schizophrenia 0.9 3,260 0.6 2,262
348 Fracture— surgery 0.8 5,313 1.0 4,097
124 Ischemic heart disease— SD 0.8 2,164 1.6 1,546
11 Cancer of gastrointestinal 
system— surgery 0.7 6,904 0.6 5,332
382 Special admission— surgery 0.7 962 0.7 648
92 Neurosis 0.6 2,903 0.7 1,986
SD, secondary diagnosis.
SOURCE: Frick and Martin, 1985,
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TABLE 3
Average Resource Consumption 
at Teaching and Nonteaching Hospitals 
(Outliers Included)
Teaching hospitals 
Nonteaching hospitals
No. of 
Cases
259,262
135,995
Average 
Length 
of Stay
9.84
8.28
Average
Total
Cost/Case
Average
Ancillary
Cost/Case
$2,443
$1,499
$933
$562
Teaching hospitals 
Nonteaching hospitals
Average
Total
Cost/Day
$248
$181
Average 
Routine 
Cost/Day
$153
$113
SOURCE: Frick and Martin, 1985.
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TABLE 4
Difference in Average Cost and Average Length of Stay 
Between Teaching and Nonteaching Hospitals 
Separated into a Case-mix Effect and a 
Within-DRG Effect (Outliers Included)^
Average in Average in
Measure of 
Resource Use
Teaching
Hospitals
Nonteaching
Hospitals Difference
Full Cost $2,734 $1,625 $1,109
Core Cost $2,100 $1,354 $ 746
Length of stay 
(days) 10.4 8.56 1.88
Measure of 
Resource Use
Case-mix
Effect
Within-DRG
Effect
Pull Cost $260 $849
Core Cost $211 $535
Length of stay (days) 0.53 1.35
^Exclusive of maternity, newborn , and mental disorder DRGs.
SOURCE : Taube and Lee, 1984.
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Percentiles of Length-of-Stay 
Distribution by Diagnostic Groups
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Scimple — Percentile (Days)— % With
Diagnostic Group Size 25 50 75 LOS 91
1 Mental retardation 80 5.9 18.1 49.2 8.80
2 Developmental 81 6.7 21.6 50.3 6.62
3 Conduct 258 13.5 36.2 80.7 19.87
4 Paranoid schizophrenia 1,278 9.4 19.1 42.9 11.34
5 Unspecified schizophrenia 781 8.3 18.4 37.8 11.48
6 Bipolar, manic 324 9.6 16.9 31.1 7.58
7 Bipolar, depressed 172 9.4 18.6 30.9 5.28
8 Major depress (single
episode) 691 8.5 17.0 27.6 1.81
9 Dementia 160 11.3 20.0 42.5 10.99
10 Major depress (recurrent) 532 9.3 19,8 31.5 3.49
11 Drug-related (excluding
dependency) 250 3.2 8.2 17.8 3.29
12 Alcohol abuse (excluding
dependency) 246 2.7 6.2 14.2 1.11
13 Alcohol related organic
disease 286 3.5 6.9 14.6 5.00
14 Other organic mental
disorder 267 8.8 16.1 25.2 7.54
15 Other schizophrenic 572 8.5 16.6 33.4 9.63
16 Schizophreniform 188 8.0 13.7 29.9 7.78
17 Schizoaffective 439 11.2 21.3 37.7 7.07
18 Paranoid 166 7.6 14.6 24.3 4.54
19 Other psychotic 293 5.5 11.1 21.8 1.31
20 Other bipolar 513 9.5 16.8 30.0 3.93
21 Other major depressive 177 8.6 16.1 32.3 3.63
22 Dysthymia 1,580 6.1 13.4 25,3 2.14
23 Anxiety (excluding
unspecified) 148 6.0 13.2 20.8 0.82
24 Unspecified anxiety 150 4.8 10.9 18.8 1.06
25 Borderline personality 254 4.3 11.3 27.2 5.16
26 Adjustment with depress
reaction 285 3.2 6.4 16.7 0.95
27 Other personality/impulse 489 5.1 11.6 24.9 5.22
28 Other adjustment 398 3.7 9.3 19.3 3.65
29 Other nonpsychotic 356 7.6 13.6 21.8 1.93
30 Social conditions 59 1.9 4.6 22.2 13.93
31 Drug dependence 151 5.6 14.3 24.2 3.12
32 Alcohol dependence 834 4.2 8.9 25.0 2.49
33 Autism/pervasive development 67 3.9 24.7 78.8 17.63
34 Somatoform and diss ciative! 65 3.9 9.3 21.7 0.29
35 Sexual disorders 25 18.2 * * 52.33
* Longer than 91 days but exact figure cannot be determined.
SOURCE: Taube and Lee, 1984.
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TABLE 6
Percentiles of the Weighted Distribution of 
Length of Stay by DRG
DRGs*
Sample
Size 10
-Percentiles (Days)--
25 50 75 90
% With 
LOS 91
424 7
425 740 1.5 3.3 7.7 18.3 35.1 3.34
426 1,579 2.9 6.1 13.3 25.3 41.5 2.14
427 363 2.5 4.8 12.3 22.4 39.8 0.83
428 743 2.2 4.8 11.5 25.5 65.2 5.20
429 507 3.8 9.2 17.5 34.4 86.5 8.82
430 6,122 4.3 8.7 17.5 32.7 79.3 7.36
431 406 3.9 9.8 32.3 75.5 16.34
432 384 3.2 7.7 13.8 23.0 39.7 3.43
433 275 0.8 1.9 4.5 9.6 19.7 0.08
434 123 3.7 6.9 16.6 25.5 43.3 3.68
435 214 2.0 4.2 9.1 19.4 59.6 3.69
436 690 2.6 4.8 10.1 26.9 42.0 300
437 214 1.3 3.1 6.2 14.8 31.2 1.24
438 251 2.1 3.9 7.8 15.5 41.8 5.65
TOTAL 12,618 2.9 6.4 14.4 28.3 66.7 5.71
*See Table 1 for description of DRG diagnostic categories. 
Longer than 91 days but exact figure cannot be determined
SOURCE: Taube and Lee, 1984.
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TABLE 7
Percentiles of Length-of-Stay Distribution 
of Medicare Patients by DRG
DRG^
Sample
Size 10
— Percentiles (Days)—  
25 50 75 90
% With 
LOS 91
424 0
425 31 4.4 8.6 11.2 19.8 29.3 3.60
426 202 5.0 8.1 16.8 27.7 43.6 2.81
427 33 1.8 4.5 9.9 22.1 30.2 1.02
428 22 3.8 6.5 22.9 47.7 90,0 9.30
429 221 6.0 10.9 18.1 30.0 62.1 4.97
430 963 4.5 9.7 18.6 32.9 74.8 6.39
431 7 2.7 3.6 8.53 11.8 b 19.47
432 57 2.5 10.0 16.4 27.1 43.5 0.33
433 27 1.0 2.6 5.6 8.8 16.8 0.00
434 5 8.8 16.2 18.0 19.7 20.8 0.00
435 11 6.2 8.5 14.6 28.3 34.7 0.00
436 62 2.5 5.7 9.9 25.0 63.0 3.69
437 23 2.8 4.6 8.8 20.3 30.2 0.00
438 47 1.4 4.2 11.6 15.3 25.3 3.37
TOTAL 1,711 4.1 8.8 16.9 29.3 64.2 5.06
^See Table 1 for description of DRG diagnostic categories. 
Longer than 91 days but exact figure cannot be determined
SOURCE; Taube and Lee, 1984.
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TABLE 8
Medicare-Certified Home Health Agencies 
by Type of Agency
December September December December December
Type of Agency 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984
Visiting nurses association 
Combination (government/
511 513 517 520 525
voluntary) 50 55 59 58 59
Government 1,274 1,234 1,211 1,230 1,226
Rehabilitation center based N/A 11 16 19 22
Hospital based 349 432 507 579 894
Skilled nursing home based N/A 10 32 136 175
Proprietary 165 287 628 997 1,569
Private nonprofit 443 547 632 674 756
Other 66 38 37 45 21
TOTAL 2,858 3,127 3,639 4,258 5,247
^NA - Not available; home agencies in these categories were classified 
as "other” in 1979.
SOURCE: D MilStead, Health Care Financing Administration, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Baltimore, MD, 
March 1985 (Assessment Board 1985).
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CD Potential Effects of Provider Financial Incentives Under PPS on Quality of Care
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C/)
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3.3"
CD
CD
T3OQ.
Cao3
T3O
CDQ.
T3
CD
(/)
(/)
Financial incantiva Behavior depends on Possible positive ellects Possible negative effects
To reduce length of hospital 
slay
To increase admissions
To avoid admitting 
“unprofitable" patients
To decrease use of services 
or change mix of services
To shift patients to 
nonhospitai sites of care
To increase hospital 
specialization
•  Physician practice patterns
• Hospital management practices
• Physician practice patterns
• Ratio of DAG price to cost
•  “Unprofitable" DRGs
•  Ability to identify severely ill 
patients at admission
• Physician practice patterns
•  Hospital management practices
•  Hospital purchasing decisions
•  Physician practice and patient 
acceptance
•  Physician specialties within the 
hospital
•  Ratios of DRG price to cost
• KAay increase psychological benefits 
for patients
• fvtay lessen chance of iatrogenic 
events
• May build specialty in particular 
DRGs In a hospital
•  May Increase specialization by 
eliminating some services
•  May decrease use of unnecessary
services
• May decrease risk from diagnostic 
tests and invasive procedures
■ May lessen chance of Iatrogenic 
events
• May increase access to other 
appropriate types of care
•  May increase volume in specific 
senrices (high volume often 
correlates with high-quality 
outcomes)
• May lead to discharge of sicker 
patients (may lead to pattern of 
admissionfdischarge/admissibn)
• May increase psychological costs 
for patients
•  May increase possibility of 
iatrogenic events
• May decrease access lor some 
patients
•  May decrease use of necessary 
technologies
• May increase use of cheaper and 
less effective materials, devices, 
and supplies
•  May decrease use of specialized 
personnel where needed
•  May decrease access to appropriate 
hospitalization
•  May decrease access for certain 
patients (locations may not be 
accessible) or for particular 
diseases (no hospital will want to 
specialize in a DRG that loses 
money overall)
SOURCE; Assessment Board, 1985. 4>00
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APPENDIX II 
GRAPH 1
Average Length of Hospital Stay 
for Medicare Patients, 1967-84
. I I I . I I  I I I I  I I I I
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
NOTE:
YEAR
Data for 1967-77 based on hospital discharges: 
admissions: 1980-84 on APM.
1978-797 on
SOURCE: G. Lintzeris, Bureau of Data Management and Strategy, Health
Care Financing Administration, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Baltimore, MD, personal communications, Dec. 
4, 1984 and Jan. 11, 1985 as cited in Technology Assessment
1985.
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GRAPH 2
Funding for the National Center for 
Health Services Research, 1970-1984 
(in millions of dollars)
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SOURCE: Association for Health Services Research, 1984, as cited in
Friedman 1984.
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GRAPH 3
Cost Per Admission by DRG Classification
COST PER ADMISSION
umm.1980 DRG CLASS'
2 2001-  1981 DRG CLASS
^   1982 DRG CLASS
2 ,0 0 0 )- —  COMPOSITE*
1,800 
1,600 
1,400 
1,200 
1,000
1979 1980 1981 1982
'The Cost Per Admission lor the 1980 DRG Class coincides 
with the Composite for the years 1979 1980.
1983
SOURCE: Frick and Martin 1984,
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